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Articles
THE DAY AFTER THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
MARC GALANTER*
Few Americans in the early months of 1986 could disagree with
the observation of Senator McConnell that:
Hardly a day goes by that we do not hear or read of the
dramatic increase in the number of lawsuits filed, of the lat-
est multimillion dollar verdict, or of another small busi-
ness, child care center, or municipal corporation that has
had its insurance cancelled out from under it.'
The reason for higher insurance rates and crowded courthouses, he
continued, is "quite simply, everyone is suing everyone, and most
are getting big money." Americans have developed a "mad ro-
mance ... with the civil litigation process." 2 Two days later, intro-
ducing the Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986, he noted that "we
are all suffering a progressively debilitating disease-the disease of
hyperlexis, too much litigation."'
This diagnosis is widely shared. Columnist Jack Anderson tells
us that:
Across the country, people are suing one another with
abandon; courts are clogged with litigation; lawyers are
burdening the populace with legal bills.
This massive, mushrooming litigation has caused hor-
rendous ruptures and dislocations at a flabbergasting cost
to the nation.4
* Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, University of Wiscon-
sin Law School. B.A., University of Chicago, 1950; M.A., 1954; J.D., 1956. This is a
revised version of the Stuart Rome Lecture, delivered at the University of Maryland
School of Law, on April 9, 1986. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Robert
Hayden, Willard Hurst, Herbert Kritzer, and Susan Silbey for helpful comments; to
Gary Wilson, Mark Lauerman, and Lynn Zuehlsdorf for able assistance; and to Michael
Morgalla for indispensable library support.
1. 132 CONG. REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986) (statement made on previous day).
2. Id.
3. Id. at S1009 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986).
4. Anderson, U.S. Has Become a Nation of Lawsuits, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1985, at B8,
col. 5.
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USA Today reports that:
Everybody in the USA suddenly seems to want to sue
anybody with liability insurance coverage. The explosion
of litigation has choked court dockets. And too-few law-
yers tell potential clients that some cases are a waste of
time.
The greed has turned the temple ofjustice, long a hal-
lowed place, into a pigsty. The time has come to clean it
up . 5
The AEtna insurance company tells us that "America's civil liability
system has gone berserk .... [It] is no longer fair. It's no longer
efficient. And it's no longer predictable." 6 The Chairman of the
Board of the National Association of Manufacturers provides a vivid
account of the crisis:
Like a plague of locusts, U.S. lawyers with their clients
have descended upon America and are suing the country
out of business. Literally. The number of product liability
suits and the size ofjury awards are soaring. Filings of per-
sonal injury cases in federal courts have jumped 600% in
the past decade.7 Product liability suits filed in federal
courts doubled from 1978 to 1985.8
In 1974, the average product liability jury award was
$345,000. Last year it averaged more than $1 million.
Product liability suits have brought a blood bath for
U.S. businesses and are distorting our traditional values.
We're now the most litigious country on earth-one of
every fifteen Americans filed a private civil suit last year.
The judicial system is so clogged with cases, delays, contin-
uances, appeals and legal shenanigans that it's slugging its
way through a perpetual traffic jam.9
These are only a few voices in a mounting chorus of condemna-
tion and concern about litigious America. For almost a decade now,
there has been increasing concern about the excessive legalization
of American society. Many observers are convinced that America
has suffered a hypertrophy of its legal institutions-manifested in
5. Hold Down Awards to Ease the Crisis, USA Today, June 6, 1986, at 12A, col. 1.
6. AEtna advertisement, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
7. Sic! See infra p. 16, Table 2.
8. This figure is too low. See infra p. 23, Table 3.
9. Dee, Blood Bath, 10 ENTERPRISE 3 (Mar./Apr. 1986).
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the presence of too much law, too many lawyers, excessive expendi-
ture on legal services, too much litigation, an obsessively conten-
tious population enthralled with adversary combat, and an intrusive
activist judiciary-and a concomitant erosion of community, decline
of self-reliance, and atrophy of informal self-regulatory mechanisms.
It has become a commonplace that the United States is the most
litigious nation on earth, indeed in human history, and that exces-
sive resort to law marks America's moral decline and portends pain-
ful political and economic consequences. A phalanx of mournful
and indignant commentators concur that America is in the throes of
a litigation crisis requiring urgent attention from policymakers.'
I would like to examine several aspects of the current discourse
about litigation: the assumption that Americans are excessively li-
tigious; the belief that this is displayed in skyrocketing court
caseloads; and the tendency to see the costs but not the benefits of
litigation.
I. THE MEANING OF HIGHER CASELOADS
The core observation that supports the "litigation explosion"
or "hyperlexis" reading of contemporary American life is that there
is more litigation-that is, that more cases are filed in American
courts. Let me begin with some reflections on the meaning of this
higher level of bringing cases.
Per capita rates of filing civil cases have risen in most localities
during recent decades. 1' Before these increases are taken as proof
of runaway litigiousness, it should be noted that these rates are not
historically unprecedented. Several studies document higher per
capita rates of civil litigation in nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury America, as well as in colonial times.'"
10. Earlier manifestations of this view are cited extensively in Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Alleg-
edly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Reading the
Landscape]; and Galanter, The Legal Malaise; or, Justice Observed, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 537
(1985) [hereinafter Legal Malaise]. Citations here are confined to the most recent layers
of this burgeoning literature.
11. Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 40. Rates per capita are only a surrogate
measure for the propensity to litigate. Presumably such a propensity depends on the
portion of occasions-troubles, injuries, problems, claims or however one characterizes
instances of possible litigation-that do lead to filings. Population is only a crude mea-
sure of such occasions. Cases are filed in only a portion of all troubles and disputes.
Since there is no longitudinal data about the lower layers of the disputing pyramid, of
which litigation forms the apex, we cannot compute changes in the rate at which trou-
bles become disputes or disputes become lawsuits.
12. McIntosh, 150 Years of Litigation and Dispute Settlement: A Court Tale, 15 LAw &
m
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More than 98% of all civil cases are filed in the state courts.
Hence, any major rise in the propensity to litigate should be detect-
able by inspecting caseload trends in the state courts. But until re-
cently, comprehensive and reliable data on state court caseload
trends have simply been unavailable.'" Through the efforts of the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC), we have recently acquired
the best data yet on state caseload trends, covering a number of
states for the years 1978 to 1984.'" The litigation explosion view
would lead us to expect this to be a period of steeply rising
caseloads. But the NCSC data, summarized in Table 1, based on all
courts that reported comparable data for the years 1978, 1981, and
1984, portrays nothing that resembles the assumed explosion. Fil-
ings of civil cases surged faster than population from 1978 to 1981,
but from 1981 to 1984, when litigation explosion lore would lead us
to expect an intensification of litigiousness, per capita rates of filing
actually declined. During this period, filings in small claims
courts-the courts most readily accessible to ordinary Americans-
also fell. Tort filings rose steadily, but over the six-year period they
grew by 9% while population grew by 8%. In the 1981-84 period, in
only five of seventeen courts for which there was tort data did filings
increase significantly more than the population, while in eight of
these courts, tort filings actually decreased.' 5
Soc'y REV. 823 (1980-81) [hereinafter 150 Years]; M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE
UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 32-34
(1984). Cf. Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 40. Even higher rates of court use in
colonial America are documented in D. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHU-
SETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692 (1979) and in Curtis, The Colonial County Court, Social
Forum and Legislative Precedent, Accomack County, Virginia, 1633-1639, 85 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 274 (1977). In assessing litigation rates, it should be recalled that the 1930s
and 1940s, which form our baseline of expectations, were a historic low point. Seacat,
The Problem of Decreasing Litigation, 8 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 135 (1940).
13. NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. & CONF. OF ST. CT. ADM'RS., STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: THE STATE OF THE ART ch. 2 (1978).
14. NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS, ST. CT. CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1984, pt. 2
(Ct. Statistics & Info. Mgmt. Project, 1986) [hereinafter NCSC REPORT 1984].
15. Id. at 182-84.
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TABLE 116
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN STATE COURT FILINGS COMPARED To
POPULATION CHANGES
BASE
[Number of
3 Year Period 3 Year Period 6 Year Period courts* reporting
TYPE OF 1978 to 1981 1981 to 1984 1978 to 1984 comparable data
CASES Population /Filings Population /Filings Population/Filings for all 3 years]
TOTAL OF +3% +14% +3% - 4% +5% + 9% 29 courts in
TORTS, 20 states
CONTRACTS,
REAL
PROPERTY
TORTS +4% + 2% +4% + 7% +8% + 9% 17 courts in
13 states
CONTRACTS +5% +14% +4% -15% +9% - 4% 11 courts in
10 states
SMALL CLAIMS +2% +18% +2% - 6% +4% +11% 29 courts in
25 states
* In this context a "court" means all the courts of a particular stratum throughout the state-e.g., the
Superior Court of California.
This evidence of current American litigation rates does not sug-
gest that rates of civil court filings are dramatically higher than in
the recent past. Nor is it the case that American rates are un-
matched in other industrial countries. Although many countries
have much lower rates of litigation, per capita use of the courts ap-
pears to be in the same range as in America in Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, England, Denmark, and Israel. 17
Filings are not an entirely satisfying measure of litigiousness.
Since it is plaintiffs who file, we tend to think of filing as measuring
plaintiff propensity to sue. But we know that most disputes are re-
solved without a filing.18 A filing represents not only a claim but a
refusal by the defendant to satisfy it. Thus, we must be open to the
notion that changes in the rate of filing may represent not only
changes in plaintiff propensity to claim, but also changes in defend-
ant propensity to resist. Or it may be that changes in filing mark
changes in the local legal culture-for example, not entering serious
negotiations until a case has been filed-so that we have no assur-
16. Source of data: NCSC REPORT 1984, supra note 14, at 177, 181, 184, 186.
17. Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 53. The infirmities of the data and the
treacherous nature of such comparisons are discussed there. Data on Israel may be
found in CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (ISRAEL), JUDICIAL STATISTICS 1984 (1985).
18. Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15
LAW & Soc'y REV. 525 (1981).
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ance that a filing represents the same stage of a dispute from one
place or one time to another.' 9
The notion that Americans have an unappeasable appetite to
pursue legal remedies runs counter to many stable features of our
legal life. If there were a generalized litigation fever, loosening the
restraints that inhibit the making of claims, we would expect to find
that the increase was general-that the rate for all types of cases
moved in the same direction. But as we see, some kinds of cases are
increasing while others are decreasing. The world of litigation is
composed of sub-populations of cases that seem to respond to spe-
cific conditions rather than to global changes in climate.
The rate of settlements remains high. The great majority of
civil cases are settled. The portion of cases that run the whole
course of possible contest has continued a long historical decline.
In the federal courts, cases reaching trial2" have fallen from 15.2%
of terminations in 1940 to 5.0% of terminations in 1985.21 In state
courts, too, a smaller portion of cases is decided by full contest than
22in past.
Wary of risks, delays, and costs, litigants do not act as if pro-
pelled by an unappeasable appetite for contest or public vindica-
19. See H. JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT: THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES
(1969); Fitzgerald, Grievances, Disputes and Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and the United
States, 1 LAw IN CONTEXT 15 (1983).
20. It should be noted that this is a measure of cases that begin trial, not of com-
pleted trials. Many cases are settled after trial has begun. For example, in a study of
insurance claims arising from automobile accidents, 23% of cases that reached trial set-
tled during trial. H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 216 (2d ed. 1980).
21. Figures on 1940 to 1980 are from Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 44; the
1985 figure is from DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 178 (1986). The Annual Report for a named year
presents figures for the 12 month period ending on June 30 of the named year. Herein-
after these reports will be cited as [year of report] ANNUAL REPORT[S].
22. Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural
Counties, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 381, 400-01 (1985); Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two
Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267, 288, 296
(1976); McIntosh, 150 Years, supra note 12, at 838-40; M. HINDUS, T. HAMMETT & B.
HOBSON, THE FILES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, 1859-1959: AN ANALYSIS
AND A PLAN FOR ACTION 147 (1979). In an unpublished study of state civil courts of
general jurisdiction in 6 cities, the late Craig Wanner found that the rate of completed
trials or hearings per 1000 of population fell from 12.2 in 1951 to 10.2 in 1981. C.
Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: 30 Years of Litigation in the United
States, ch. 6, Table 1. Also noteworthy is the decline in the number ofjury trials from
the early 1960s to 1980-a period of increased filings and larger jury awards. M. SHAN-
LEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND
COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980, at 19-20 (1983).
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tion."3 For plaintiffs24 and defendants25 alike, litigation proves a
miserable, disruptive, painful experience. Few litigants have a good
time or bask in the esteem of their fellows 2 6-indeed, they may be
stigmatized.27  Even those who prevail may find the process very
costly. 28 (Which is not, of course, to say that litigants are necessarily
23. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that more than a tiny minority of claim-
ants correspond to that figure of folklore, the schemer who wants to turn a trivial injury
into a bonanza. But cf. Hold Down Awards To Ease The Crisis, supra note 5 (which descries
"litigants with minimal complaints, hoping for huge judgments for pain and suffering
[who] are too willing to pay enormous contingency fees to lawyers who routinely shoot
craps with the justice system").
24. See, e.g., G. LANOUE & B. LEE, LAWSUITS AND LITIGANTS: THE IMPACT OF ACA-
DEMIc DISCRIMINATION CASES ON THE PARTIES AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming);
Crowe, Complainant Reactions to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 12 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 217 (1978); Naftulin, The Psychological Effects of Litigation on the Industrially
Injured Patient: A Research Plea, 39(4) INDUS. MED. 26 (Apr. 1970). These assessments are
paralleled by biographical accounts of individual plaintiffs: R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY
PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW ch. 1 (1978); E.B. GOODMAN, ALL THE JUSTICE I COULD AF-
FORD 104, 132, 210, 259 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Charles, Wilber & Kennedy, Physicians' Self-Reports of Reactions to Malprac-
tice Litigation, 141 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 563 (1984). Also see the following biographical
accounts of individual defendants: E. ASINOF, BLEEDING BETWEEN THE LINES (1979); S.
CHARLES & E. KENNEDY, DEFENDANT: A PSYCHIATRIST ON TRIAL FOR MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE (1985); Eisenberg, A Doctor on Tial, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at
26.
26. Few Americans engage in litigation as a sport, as do the Lipay described by
Frake, quoted in Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, 67(6) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, 1, 21
(1965). Nor is participation in litigation regarded as a mark of estimable personal
skills-as it is among the Saga, see L. FALLERS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN
ACTION IN THE COURTS OF COLONIAL BUSOGA (1969); the Barotse, see M. GLUCKMAN, THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955); the Arusha, see
F. Dubow, Explaining Litigation Rates in Rural and Urban Tanzania (paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, June 2-5, 1983); and the
Nandiwallas, see R. Hayden, "No One is Stronger than the Caste"-Arguing Dispute
Cases in an Indian Caste Panchayat (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1981).
27. The plaintiff in a plagiarism suit reports:
No sooner had the lawsuit been filed than stories appeared, little items in
the trade press-"disgruntled author suing." And little jokes were heard about
Levin and his lawsuits .... I was a troublemaker, always in the courts-"But I
never before brought a lawsuit in my life! . . ." More jokes. And then there
came a certain word. Levin was litigious. The word seemed to be echoing all
around me. I was litigious by nature, a constant troublemaker.
M. LEVIN, THE OBSESSION 145 (1973).
28. For example, the firefighter who quit her job after winning a discrimination com-
plaint (she had been forbidden to breastfeed her infant during free time on duty) ex-
plained: "Ever since my suit I was fair game ... I was the brunt of all their hostilities."
Battle Won, War? N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, at E7, col. 3.
The victor in one of the classic church-state cases observed that:
Vindication by the highest court in the land did not make the McCollums
heroes at home. It did not mean that we could quietly assume our former way
of life and status in the community. We will never be forgiven nor accepted by
1986]
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worse off than if they hadn't litigated.29 )
A humble example will show the mythic character of the litiga-
tion mania. The greatest single source of the bulge in filings is the
increase in divorce (and post-divorce) proceedings. "[D]omestic re-
lations cases dominate state court dockets.1'3' All of us know many
of the parties in these cases. Few of us, I suspect, know many peo-
ple who filed for divorce because they were enamored of litigation
or beguiled by lawyers. What attracts users is not, I think, the desire
to use the legal system but the hope for a solution to what they con-
sider an otherwise intractable problem.
For other groups of law users, too, using the courts appears the
best of unpleasant alternatives. In a study of disputing in three
neighborhoods of a New England city, Sally Merry and Susan Silbey
conclude that their respondents
those who fought and spoke against us; and many others are still fearful of
appearing too friendly.
[My husband's] career suffered. True, he could remain on the faculty; but
his bargaining power for position, rank, and salary were gone. Institutions, we
discovered, do not go out of their way to solicit for employment a professor
whose name is associated so prominently with a religious issue. As dissenters,
we were lucky to be able to stay where we were, let alone expect to find ad-
vancement elsewhere.
V. C. MCCOLLUM, ONE WOMAN'S FIGr 195 (rev. ed. 1961).
A generation later, the black attorney who successfully challenged Alabama's law
mandating a moment of silence in public schools reflected:
"Had I known what I was going to go through, I would not have filed the
case solely because of the effects on my children .... They resent the fact that
I brought the case. They received criticism at school .... My own children call
it a stupid case.
In the black community, I'm sort of looked down upon .... That's the
lasting effect. I've lost credibility in the black community."
Victor in Alabama Prayer Case Resented and Isolated, L.A. Times, June 5, 1985, at A12, col. 4
(quotation reordered).
29. In a follow up study of the litigants in the Buffalo Creek disaster,
Evidence... that the litigation was not prolonging their suffering, was obtained
by a comparison of their responses.., with those of a small group of nonliti-
gants. This comparison indicated that nonlitigants, if anything, were suffering
more symptomatology than litigants. Certainly there was no evidence to sug-
gest that the lawsuit was causing a prolongation of the psychic distress exper-
ienced by the survivors.
G. GLESER, B. GREEN & C. WINGET, PROLONGED PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF DISASTER: A
STUDY OF BUFFALO CREEK 140 (1981).
30. COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
38, 166 (1984). This is based on a survey of courts of general jurisdiction in eight states
in 1976. In all but one state domestic relations cases made up more than 50% of the
total caseload. In California the portion was 38.5%.
Of all the common types of disputes studied in the Civil Litigation Research Project,
post-divorce disputes were most likely to end up in court. Miller & Sarat, supra note 18,
at 537.
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seek to avoid court for a variety of reasons from fear of
antagonizing the people they live with every day to the loss
of control that court entails. When people do bring inter-
personal disputes to court, they tend to be complex, in-
tense, and involuted problems in which the moral values at
stake appear sufficiently important to outweigh the con-
demnation of this behavior.
[F]or all respondents, turning to court and police with
problems is a last resort to be used only if "the problems
are very serious," "it can't be avoided," "it is absolutely
necessary," and "you have tried everything else."'"
Why do the nonlitigious sue? In his famous June 1978 com-
mencement address at Harvard, Alexander Solzhenitsyn expressed
his misgivings about various features of Western society, including
its tendency to assert legal rights to solve every conflict:
A society based on the letter of the law and never reaching
any higher fails to take advantage of the full range of
human possibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and
formal to have a beneficial influence on society. Whenever
the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relationships, this
creates an atmosphere of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes
man's noblest impulses.32
A group of admirers who sought to assemble a volume of com-
mentary "to place Solzhenitsyn's ideas in historical, political, and
philosophical perspective" found the author unwilling to allow the
speech to be reprinted:
Thinking that we were forbidden to use only the published
version of the address, we then had a new translation made
This process of seeking permission and producing a
new translation consumed the better part of a year.
Finally, in January 1980, the book was ready to go to
press. We sent page proofs to Solzhenitsyn and invited
him and his wife to come to Washington at our expense to
attend a press lunch launching the book. The reply was a
phone call and a follow up telegram from Harper & Row
asserting that our publication of the address in any transla-
tion would be considered a violation of the author's copy-
right and theirs. We then tried, both directly . . .and
31. Merry & Silbey, What Do Plaintifs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST.
Sys.J. 151, 172-73 (1985).
32. SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD: THE ADDRESS, TWELVE EARLY RESPONSES, AND SIX
LATER REFLECTIONS 8 (R. Berman ed. 1980) [hereinafter SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD].
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through intermediaries, to get Solzhenitsyn to relent. He
would not.
On April 30 of this year a legal complaint was filed on
our behalf in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, asking that Solzhenitsyn and Harper & Row be
prohibited from charging us with copyright infringement if
we published the address in our book. The complaint al-
leged that the threats of copyright infringement against us
violated our First Amendment rights and the "fair use"
provisions of the copyright law. A week later Harper &
Row notified our lawyers that we had been granted permis-
sion to reprint the Harper & Row version of the speech.
Our complaint was withdrawn .. .
We need not imagine that Solzhenitsyn abandoned his scorn of
Western legalism to understand the attraction of the threat to sue as
a way of controlling the unwelcome attentions of this band of stran-
gers. The admirers, too, were presumably sympathetic with his
views. But, having made a major investment and finding themselves
stymied, and having pursued other avenues of relief and finding
none that supplied any leverage over the recalcitrant author, they
found filing suit an available and viable way to solve the problem.
The result is an example of the classic pattern of American litiga-
tion: the filing created a setting for serious negotiations between the
parties; positions were assessed "in the [s]hadow of the [1]aw, ' '1 4 in-
cluding, I surmise, the shadow of the costs and risks of the proceed-
ing;35 concessions were made; and, as in most American litigation,
the process was attenuated by a settlement without any direct official
input.
Those who are distressed at America's excessive litigiousness
often gaze longingly at Japan, which is thought to have remained
uncorrupted by excessive legalism. The Japanese, the story goes,
have few lawyers, avoid conflict, disdain legalism, and resolve dis-
putes by conciliation.3 6 Late last year the Reader's Digest decided to
33. LeFever, Foreword to SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD, supra note 32, at viii-ix.
34. That is, by anticipation of what courts might do. Mnookin & Komhauser, Bar-
gaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
35. Galanter,Justice in Many Rooms, 19J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981) [hereinafter
Justice in Many Rooms].
36. Japan plays a central role in litigation explosion mythology as a benign black
hole of anti-litigiousness. The reality is less enchanting. The deliberate limitation of
institutional capacity to provide adjudication is documented in Haley, The Myth of the
Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 359 (1978); and Haley, Sheathing the Sword of
Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 265 (1982).
The alleged paucity of lawyers in Japan also fails to withstand examination. Twelve
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terminate its Japanese edition.
On Dec. 17, the union [representing Reader's Digest's Japa-
nese employees] appealed to the Tokyo District Court to
seize movable assets such as furniture as security for retire-
ment payments owed to union members; the court exe-
cuted the order the next day. The union has also filed
complaints with Japan's Ministries of Labor, Finance, For-
eign Affairs, and International Trade and Industry. It is
preparing a lawsuit charging the company with violations
of its employees' civil rights, and plans to extend its suit to
the parent company in the United States. It has also ap-
pealed to the Tokyo labor relations committee to inter-
vene, charging Reader's Digest with attempting to destroy
the union .... 37
What, we may ask, makes the unlitigious Japanese so eager to
sue? Dispute resolution theory suggests a number of reasons why
recourse to litigation might be expected. First, the stakes for the
workers are extremely high-their very livelihood-and we know
that even those disinclined to use courts will do so if vital and irre-
placeable resources such as land, power, or reputation are
threatened. 38 Second, there is nothing to lose. Since Reader's Digest
is leaving, there is no continuing relationship to be threatened.
And, as important, there is no continuing relationship to serve as a
thousand--often cited as the number of lawyers in Japan-is the number of bengoshi cer-
tified to act as advocates in court. But there are a number of other law occupations in
Japan: in-house legal advisors, judicial scriveners, administrative scriveners, patent at-
torneys, tax attorneys, and so forth. An American lawyer working in Japan estimated the
total number of persons doing legal work there in 1982 as 95,342, which would put the
ratio of legal workers in Japan in the higher rather than the lower part of the compara-
tive range. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 201 (Practicing Law Inst. 1983). On the comparative pres-
ence of lawyers, see Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 52.
Japanese disinterest in the law is belied by the observation of a Japanese law profes-
sor that:
[T]here is in Japan a massive diversion of younger talent into the world of
law. Every year more than 38,000 youngsters graduate from law faculties in
Japan as compared to 36,000 who graduate from U.S. law schools. Since the
population of Japan is approximately half that of the United States, there are
proportionately two times more law graduates produced in Japan.
Tsubota, Myth and Truth on Non-Litigiousness in Japan, 30 [University of Chicago] Law
School Record 8 (Spring 1984).
37. Chira, Reader's Digest Leaves Japan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,1985, at 21, col. 1, 27, col.
4 (nat'l ed.).
38. Starr & Yngvesson, Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-in on Compromise Decisions, 2 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 553 (1975); Mendelsohn, The Pathology of the Indian Legal System, 15 MoD.
ASIAN STUD. 823 (1981).
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locus for alternative remedial actions. 39 Finally, the absence of con-
sultation, the overtly self-regarding stance, and the perceived viola-
tion of responsibility provided the spur of indignation to overcome
reluctance to litigate.40
The Solzhenitsyn and Reader's Digest stories remind us that even
those ideologically disinclined to use the courts sometimes do so.
People find themselves in a situation in which they are affected by
others, but have no leverage to control those others and hold them
accountable.4 ' In such a predicament, courts may be a recourse,
usually a reluctant one.4 2
And modern society throws up more of these predicaments.
Modern technology increases the power of remote actions to im-
pinge on us. An increasing portion of our dealings and of our dis-
putes are with remote actors. Increasingly our transactions and
disputes are not with other persons, but with corporate organiza-
tions.43 The growth of knowledge enables us to trace out these con-
nections and establish responsibility for these ramifying
consequences. Education and wealth make us more competent in
using institutions. Law is a way to control and hold accountable re-
mote and overwhelming actors. We use law more both in its whole-
sale and ex ante form (legislation and administrative regulation) and
in its retail and ex post form (litigation). We would expect litigation
39. Cf. Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business, 28 Am. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) and
its vast progeny, assessed in various contributions to Law, Private Governance and Continu-
ing Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 461.
40. The literature on Japan contains fascinating accounts of collective litigation cam-
paigns, conducted with great moral intensity for long periods by organized groups of
victims against corporations who are perceived to have conducted themselves badly by
denying responsibility for their victims. See, e.g., Ino, Nishida, Sota, Yamakawa,
Akiyama, Fuketa, Yoshikawa & Yamada, Diary of a Plaintiffis' Attorneys' Team in the
Thalidomide Litigation, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 136 (1975); Upham, Litigation and Moral Conscious-
ness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, 10 LAW & Soc'v REVIEW
579 (1976); Reich, Public and Private Responses to a Chemical Disaster in Japan: the Case of
Kanemi Yusho, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 102 (1982).
41. One may lack leverage to control intimates as well as strangers. See Yngvesson,
Re-examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 623 (discussing the use of
courts among intimates).
42. Of course, courts are only one method of redress. Cf. Black, Crime as Social Con-
trol, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 34 (1983) (discussing self-help-which is often classified as crime
in modern society-as a means of social control).
43. As societies industrialize, an increasing portion of serious disputes is between
entities of different sizes-typically between individuals and large organizations-rather
than between comparable entities. S. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
APPROACH ch. 3 (1978); J. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (1973); J.
COLEMAN, THE ASYMMETRIC SOCIETY (1982).
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to vary with changing perceptions of problems and estimates of al-
ternative solutions.
II. THE CHANGING WORKLOAD OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Although only a small fraction of all American litigation takes
place in the federal courts, I would like to examine recent trends in
the caseload and disposition patterns of the federal courts. The rea-
son for focusing on the federal courts is fourfold. First, information
about these courts is more comprehensive and continuous than for
the state courts. Second, figures on federal courts are frequently
cited as the proof of runaway litigiousness. Third, the recent eleva-
tion of filings in the federal courts has been more dramatic than in
the state courts.44 Thus, if there are portents of doom in the court
statistics they ought to be discernible there. Finally, federal court
litigation involves higher status actors and is more visible to and
through the media. Hence, it occupies a portion of our public sym-
bolic space far larger than its share of the caseload.
Let me insert a caution about our tendency to give great
credence to such figures. Lord Beveridge is reported to have said,
"Nobody believes a theory except the one who formulates it; every-
one believes a figure except the one who calculates it." In discus-
sions of policy, figures like litigation rates are theories, especially
slippery ones because the assumptions embedded in them are hard
to see and especially persuasive ones because they are disguised as
mere facts.
So, taking as our maxim Canning's observation that "nothing is
so fallacious as facts, except figures," let us examine the available
information on federal court caseloads for 1984, taking 1975 as a
convenient baseline.45 Table 2, which summarizes some of the data
found in these reports, shows a striking 123% increase in filings
over that nine-year span.
44. During the six-year period 1978-84 in which civil filings increased 9% in state
courts, supra p. 7, Table 1, they increased 88% in federal courts, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 21, at 130.
45. Since this lecture was delivered, the Annual Report for 1985 has been published.
I was tempted to present the 1985 instead of the 1984 figures. Ten is a nice round
number. On reflection, it seems more interesting to retain 1984 for the major compari-
son, using the 1985 figures to convey a sense of the volatility and variability of trends in
case filings.
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TABLE 246
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
SELECTED CATEGORIES, 1975 AND 1984
Fraction of Source:
Absolute Annual
C O Increase Increase Report at
CATEGORY 1975 1984 Change [Decrease] 75-'84 Page:
Total Filings
1. Prisoner Petitions
A. State
B. Federal
2. Recovery of
Overpayment and
Enforcement of
Judgments
3. Civil Rights
A. Public Accomodation
B. Employment
Discrimination
4. Social Security
A. Black Lung
5. Torts
A. Products Liability
117,320
19,307
14,260
5,047
681
10,392
601
3,931
5,846
2,793
25,691
2,886*
261,485
31,107
26,581
4,526
46,190
21,219
291
9,748
29,985
59
37,522
122.9%
61.1%
86.4%
-10.3%
6682.7%
104.2%
-51.6%
148.0%
412.9%
-97.9%
46.0%
10,745** 272.3%
144,165
11,800
12,321
[-521]
45,509
10,827
[-310]
5,817
24,139
[-2,734]
11,831
7,859
31.6%
7.5%
4.0%
16.7%
8.2%
5.4%
1984: 124
1984: 143
1984: 135
1984: 145
1984: 138
(1975: 226)
(1975: 228)
1984: 133
(1975: 194)
1984: 148
(1975: 218)
TOTAL OF FIVE 104,627 72.5%
'GAINERS" (IA, 2,3,4,5)
SOME "LOSERS"
6. Anti-Trust 1,467 1,201 -18.3% [-266] 1984: 151
7. Fraud, including 2,237 1,842 -17.6% [-395] 1985: 280
truth-in-lending
8. Class Actions 3,061 988 -67.7% [-2073] 1984: 160
* includes 278 contracts cases
** includes 619 contracts cases
46. Source of data: 1975 & 1984 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 21, page numbers as
noted above.
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Do these figures manifest a generalized increase in the litigious-
ness of the American population, a lowering of public thresholds of
legal irritability? Do they evidence the "increasing tendency of
Americans to define all distresses, anxieties and wounds as legal
problems .... [W]here Americans were once willing to withstand
setbacks, they now turn to the courts for relief whenever things work
out badly."4 7
If we break down the overall increase we notice that the in-
crease in filings over the nine years is heavily concentrated in a few
areas. Indeed, five categories of cases-recovery of overpayments,48
social security cases, prisoner petitions, torts, and civil rights
cases-account for almost three-quarters of the entire increase in
filings.
Half of the total increase is accounted for by two giant in-
creases-recovery cases and social security cases. Each is the result
of deliberate and calculated official policy-to recover overpay-
ments of veterans' benefits by litigation and to curtail disability ben-
efits by summarily removing beneficiaries from the rolls.49 Is the
413% increase in social security cases to be understood as an out-
break of litigiousness among social security claimants?50 Does it
make sense to take the 6,683% increase in recovery cases as evi-
dence of an outbreak of litigiousness among federal officials? Like
social security recipients whose disability payments were termi-
nated,5' federal officials were confronted with a problem and turned
47. Cannon, Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for Alternatives, 63 NAT'L Fo-
RUM 10, 11 (1983).
48. The category "Recovery of Overpayments and Enforcement of Judgments" re-
fers to civil suits, almost all of them filed by the United States, to recover overpayments
of veterans' benefits (over 90%) and to recover defaulted student loans. 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 132.
49. Terminated recipients then had to sue for restoration. The impact on the
caseload was compounded by the administration's policy of "non-acquiescence,"
whereby it refused to generalize the results in earlier judicial decisions to restore bene-
fits, fighting each subsequent claim in spite of fresh opposing precedent. This policy
was modified in June 1985. Strasser, SSA 's Shift on Appeals is Slammed by Critics, Nat'l LJ,
June 17, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
50. The following year there was a precipitous 34% drop in Social Security cases-
from 29,983 to 19,771. Just a few months earlier (the reporting year began on July 1,
1984) the government had modified its termination policy: "The disability reviews were
halted in April 1984 in response to harsh criticism from many members of Congress,
Federal judges and governors, who said the Reagan Administration was improperly
throwing thousands of disabled people off the rolls." Pear, U.S. Starts Culling Ineligibles
From Disability Benefit Rolls, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1986, at 11, col. 4.
51. Another example of litigation as a response to miserly policies of benefit admin-
istration is the pathetic instance of elderly wives in New York suing to obtain support
from husbands confined to nursing homes. State rules permit the wife of a Medicaid
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to the courts to solve it because nothing better was at hand.5 2
But how about cases that reflect individual initiative rather than
tracking the contours of changing executive policy-do these reflect
an increase in litigiousness? Consider prisoner petitions: in our
nine-year period, there was a 61% increase in prisoner petitions.
During this period, the prison population of the United States grew
by 74%5 The number of petitions per 1,000 prisoners actually
dropped from 73.4 per 1,000 in 1975 to 67.1 per 1,000 in 1984.54
Whatever the explanation for these trends, it seems more likely to
reflect responses to specific settings than the rise or fall of an appe-
tite for litigious contest or a proclivity to define issues as legal
wrongs.
The increase in civil rights cases displays a somewhat different
pattern. If we can assume that the period from 1975 to 1984 is one in
which discrimination was declining in many areas of American life,
is not the increase in civil rights cases evidence of increasing litig-
iousness? Disputing about discrimination has a very distinct profile
compared to disputing about other matters. The lowering of barri-
ers multiplies potential instances of violation-for example, once
members of a minority are hired, there is a vast increase in the op-
portunities for experiencing discrimination on thejob.55 In discrim-
ination grievances, there is a pronounced appetite for vindication of
principle. One suggestive study reported that in contrast to other
kinds of problems, in which most respondents sought "satisfactory
adjustment," a strikingly high proportion of those experiencing dis-
crimination problems sought 'justice. ' ' 56 Yet those with discrimina-
recipient to retain only $400 per month from savings and pensions without loss of bene-
fits, but court-ordered support payments are exempt from such calculations. So some
30 women in New York City sued their institutionalized husbands for support. Sullivan,
Nursing Costs Force Elderly to Sue Spouses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
52. In 1985 filings of recovery cases climbed another 25% to 58,160. 1985 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 131.
53. 1975 figures are from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATIsncs-1977 (1978), at 629; 1984 figures from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (Apr. 1985), at 2; 1985 figures from id., June 1986, at 2.
54. This is a composite of very different populations. As state prison populations
grew from 242,750 in 1975 to 429,603 in 1984 and 463,378 in 1985, the rate of petitions
rose from 58.7 per thousand in 1975 to 61.9 per thousand in 1984, falling back to 58.7
per thousand in 1985. But among federal prisoners (24,131 in 1975; 34,263 in 1984;
40,223 in 1985) the rate of petitions dropped sharply from 209.2 per thousand in 1975
to 132.1 per thousand in 1984, then jumped to 155.7 per thousand in 1985.
55. Cf. L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS
COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 159 (1968) (observing that the profile of discrimi-
nation complaints tracks patterns of employment rather than patterns of exclusion).
56. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
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tion grievances are inclined to "lump it." The Civil Litigation
Research Project found that far fewer discrimination grievances
were translated into claims than was the case with other kinds of
grievances. In all types of middle range disputes combined, 1,000
grievances led to 718 claims, but in discrimination matters, 1,000
grievances produced only 294 claims. Where discrimination claims
were made, a high proportion ended up as disputes. 57 But a rela-
tively low proportion of these disputes was taken to a lawyer and a
low proportion of these resulted in court filings. Overall 1,000
grievances led to 50 court filings, but in discrimination matters,
1,000 grievances led to only 8 court filings.58 Pursuing a discrimina-
tion complaint is an extremely painful process, exposing the claim-
ant to social discreditation and self-doubt. 9 Thus, discrimination is
an area where a great appetite for vindication coexists with formida-
ble obstacles to making and pursuing such claims, leaving a great
pool of grievances that could become cases if those obstacles were
dissipated. The increase in civil rights cases suggests that the pur-
suit of these claims is being successfully institutionalized.6 °
This does not mean we should expect a continuous exponential
growth of discrimination cases, for practices are changing, too, in
the direction of the anti-discrimination norms embodied in the law.
As nondiscrimination norms are institutionalized, disputing about
discrimination may become more "normal," leading to levels of dis-
REV. 401, 413 (1975). Mayhew reports, based on a study of Detroit metropolitan area
residents, that of those respondents reporting serious problems, only a tiny proportion
sought "justice" or legal vindication-except in discrimination. Only 4% of those with
serious problems connected with expensive purchases sought "justice"; only 2% of
those with neighborhood problems did so. But 31% of those reporting discrimination
problems sought "justice."
57. For claims overall, only 62.5% became disputes; but 73.4% of discrimination
claims became disputes. Miller & Sarat, supra note 18, at 544.
58. Id.
59. See G. LANOUE & B. LEE, supra note 24; K. BUMILLER, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE VIcTIM: THE DENIAL OF SELF-RESPECT By VICTIMS
WrrHouT A CAUSE (Univ. of Wisc. Disputes Processing Research Program Working Pa-
per No. 1984-6, 1984). Crowe observes:
Although it is the respondents who are charged with wrongdoing before the
MCAD, it is the complainants who feel they are being placed on the defensive.
The burden of proving a specific, discrete act of discrimination can seem as
unjust as the discrimination itself .... [Slome complainants feel humiliated
when they must admit that they suffered, and were hurt by discrimination.
Crowe, supra note 24, at 229.
60. Cf. Burstein & Monaghan, Equal Employment Opportunity and the Mobilization of Law,
LAw & Soc'y REV. - [forthcoming], which concludes, on the basis of claimants' suc-
cess rates, the focusing of cases on significant targets, and the availability of lawyers and
other help, that EEO laws are being successfully mobilized.
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puting similar to those in other areas.6
In one kind of civil rights cases, we see a marked decrease in
filings-public accommodations cases fell by 51% during our nine-
year period.62 There were declines in other categories of cases, in-
cluding several that represent major expenditures of resources for
the courts. Antitrust cases declined by 16%.63 Fraud and truth-in-
lending cases fell by 18%.64 Class actions, often viewed as an en-
gine of legal aggression against business, fell by 68% from 3,061 in
1975 to 988 in 1984 (that is, from 2.6% of filings to 0.4%).65 And
within the burgeoning social security areas, black lung cases fell by
98% from their 1975 level.6 6 A particular group of victims worked
their way through the system-as asbestos victims are doing now.
Finally, we come to the area that has excited the most concern
in recent debate about the litigation crisis-torts. Unlike these other
categories, which have loomed large in federal courts only in recent
years, torts have always made up a substantial portion of the cases
entering federal courts. The influx of other business has in the past
generation sharply reduced the percentage of tort cases. In 1960,
36.2% of all civil filings were tort cases.6 7 But due to increases in
other categories, only 14.3% of federal court filings in 1984 were
tort cases.68
In our nine-year period, the number of tort filings increased
61. Short-term fluctuations in the incidence of civil rights cases are difficult to inter-
pret, since case levels reflect changes in the underlying behavior, in expectations and
perceptions of fair treatment, and in the resources for and perceived rewards and costs
of litigation vis-a-vis alternative responses. In 1985, there was a 7.9% decrease in civil
rights filings, paced by a sharp 17.1% drop in employment discrimination claims. 1985
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 151.
62. The decline continued with a further 13.1% drop from 1984 to 1985. Id.
63. And by a further 3.7% from 1984 to 1985. Id. at 156.
64. This category seemed to be fading away, having dropped from 2,237 in 1975 to
941 in 1983 (1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 132), when a 97% increase in 1984
brought it to 1,842. In 1985, there was a 1.4% drop to 1,816. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 21, at 160.
65. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 160. In 1985 they fell a further 1.7% to
971. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 166.
66. In 1985, Black Lung cases rose by 61% from 59 to 95-but were still only a tiny
fraction of the 2,793 of 1975. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 145; 1975 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 225.
67. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 230-33, Table C-2. My total is for the 86
district courts only, excluding local and territorial jurisdictions. It includes U.S. plaintiff
tort cases (265), U.S. defendant tort cases (1218), FELA cases (1085), Jones Act cases
(2645), and diversity tort cases (12,82 )-altogether 18,034 out of a total of 49,852 fil-
ings in the 86 districts.
68. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 133.
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from 25,691 in 1975 to 37,522 in 1984.69 Of this increase of
11,831, almost two-thirds (7,859) was contributed by an increase in
products liability cases.70 Products liability filings increased by
272% during this period, while the remainder of the tort category
increased by a modest 17%. So it seems that within the tort cate-
gory we have touched the fiery heart of the litigation explosion-a
junction of rapidly mounting caseloads, expanding frontiers of lia-
bility and skyrocketing recoveries. 7 1 To demonstrate "Burgeoning
Tort Liability as a Major Cause of the Insurance Availability/
69. 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 346; 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21,
at 253. This rose 10.3% to 41,593 in 1985. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 280.
70. In 1975 products liability filings were 2,886; in 1984 products liability filings
were 10,745. Supra p.16, Table 2.
71. Commentators on products liability regularly point out that the average verdict
in such cases is over one million dollars. "[N]obody sues for a couple of thousand dol-
lars any more: court judgments now average more than $1 million. Awards of $5 mil-
lion are now common, and much higher awards are far from rare." Conine, The Big
Losers in Liability Judgments Are Us, Milwaukee J., Nov. 24, 1985, "Accent on the News"
section, at 15, col. 2; Dee, supra note 9; Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986,
at 20. This item of information has its origin in computations by Jury Verdict Research,
Inc. [JVR], which reported that in 1984, the average award in products liability cases was
some $1,021,956. INJURY VALUATION: CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IV, No. 304, at 19
(1986) (hereinafter INJURY VALUATION). Examination of this source suggests some
needed qualifications. First, this computation of average award is an average of awards
in favor of plaintiffs-but "less than one half of these cases results in a plaintiff verdict
when tried by a jury." Id. at 20. Second, this very valuable, and admittedly incomplete,
data compilation is a small sample of products liability verdicts. JVR's 1984 average is
based on a population of 337 plaintiff verdicts. Id. at 19. Assuming an equal or slightly
higher number of defendant verdicts, that would come to about 700 verdicts altogether.
This is a small portion of the whole universe of products liability verdicts. There is no
count anywhere of these, even in the federal courts. But we can estimate from the 2,495
tort jury trials in the federal courts in 1984, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at
Table C-4, that there were approximately 800 products liability verdicts. This estimate
is based on the fact that almost one-third of tort filings in federal courts in 1984 were
products liability cases and that products liability cases seem to be tried in a slightly
greater proportion than other torts cases. There are at least 12 times as many tort jury
trials in the state courts each year as in the federal courts. Even if a smaller percentage
of state tort jury trials are products liability cases-say only 10%-that would mean a
minimum of 4000 products liability jury verdicts, state and federal, in 1984. Third,
JVR's sample is selective; it aims to include "significant" or "important" verdicts, not
typical ones; and it makes "every effort to collect reliable information on all million
dollar verdicts ...." INJURY VALUATION, supra, at 12. Hence there is reason to believe
that JVR averages give disproportionate weight to the high end of the range. Cf. Lo-
calio, Variations on $962,258. The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, 13(3) LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 126 (1985) (arguing that the average medical malpractice jury verdict
published by JVR suffers from many of these same weaknesses); S. Daniels, Civil Juries,
Jury Verdict Reporters, and the Going Rate 6 (paper prepared for the 1986 Meeting of
the Law & Soc'y Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., May 29-Jun. 1, 1986) (available from Am. Bar.
Found., Chicago, Ill.) (arguing that JVR's coverage is selective and emphasizes what it
considers precedent-setting verdicts).
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Affordability Crisis," the Attorney General's Tort Policy Working
Group cites as its first item of evidence:
The growth in the number of product liability suits has
been astounding. For example, the number of product lia-
bility cases filed in federal district courts has increased
from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase
. . . . There is no reason to believe that the state courts
have not witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the
number of product liability claims.72
We are advised to consider this increase as an "example," rep-
resentative of some larger population of cases. What is in this
"product liability" category? Starting in 1974, the Annual Report
separated out products liability filings from other torts. The next
year a set of sub-categories was specified. These have remained the
same until 1984 when the "other" sub-category was further divided
into "asbestos" and "other." Table 3 shows the number of filings
counted in each category from 1974 to 1985.
72. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
45 (Feb. 1986). But the more modest rise in tort filings in the state courts over most of
this period, supra p.7, Table 1, gives some reason to believe the increase in state courts
has been less dramatic. Unfortunately no state court data break out products liability
filings separately.
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If we separate out the other tort claims from those labelled as
products liability claims, we see that in the course of these twelve
years they increased from 22,662 to 28,039-an increase of 23.7%.
Products liability cases, on the other hand, increased 758% over this
period-32 times as fast. The pattern of products liability claims in
federal courts is distinctively different from, rather than typical of,
other tort claims there-much less is it typical of tort claims
elsewhere.
But what are these products liability cases? The six defined
sub-categories have been relatively stable. Filings in these sub-cate-
gories increased from 1,278 in 1975 to 2,049 in 1985-a 60% in-
crease. But they only make up a small portion of the products
liability category--44% in 1975, falling to just 15% in 1985. As the
products liability category has grown over the years, an increasing
portion is located in the "other" sub-category, which has grown far
more rapidly than the specified categories. What are these "other"
cases?
74
In good part the answer is that they are asbestos cases. During
1984, the form was changed to count asbestos cases separately.75 In
that year, 2,788 of the 8,521 "other" products liability filings were
asbestos cases. (Since the new forms were introduced about one-
third of the way through the record keeping year, we may assume
that the portion of filings that were asbestos cases was actually
higher-perhaps 4,000 or so if there was no seasonal variation.) In
1985, the first full year of counting asbestos cases, they made up
4,239 of the 11,505 "other" filings-31.3% of the whole products
liability category.
It seems likely that asbestos cases have been a major factor dur-
ing the whole period in which products liability cases have been
counted. There is no direct count before 1984, but there seems to
be a heavy concentration of "other" products liability cases in those
74. Before 1984, the Annual Report gives only occasional hints: in 1976, it noted
that "the bulk" of products liability personal injury cases alleged "injury due to malfunc-
tion of household appliances, tools and assorted manufactured products," 1976 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 194; in 1977 and 1978 it was reported that the "majority" of
these cases involved injuries "due to malfunctioning household appliances, tools and
other manufactured products," 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 211; 1978 AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 210. In 1979, it was reported that the number was swol-
len as a result of two major air crashes and over 400 swine flu vaccine cases. 1979
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 229.
75. The count of products liability cases, and the categorization of filings generally,
is done on the basis of entries on the cover sheet (JS-44) filled out by the plaintiffs
attorney at the time suit is filed. The form contains a listing of some 85 types of suits;
the attorney is instructed to place an "X" in the one box that is "most definitive."
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districts that are the source of most asbestos claims. 76 It is esti-
mated that during this period there were more than 16,000 asbestos
cases filed in the federal courts 77-that would be more than a quar-
ter of the cumulative total of 60,508 products liability filings
counted from 1974 to 1985.
In these asbestos cases, we again encounter litigation whose
presence is not plausibly explained in terms of a change in the un-
derlying proclivity to sue. By the early 1980s, broad dissemination
of information about the injurious qualities of asbestos, the pres-
ence of an experienced asbestos bar, and concern about possible
cut-offs of liability to future claimants, were mobilizing large num-
bers from the pool of asbestos victims-a pool that is destined to
diminish over the coming decades.78
If a single set of related products cases makes up one-quarter of
the total, one wonders what other major clusterings are contained in
this category. At least one other product-the Dalkon Shield-was
the subject of thousands of cases during this period.79 We might
then expect that the major movements of the products liability cate-
gory will reflect the flow and ebb of waves of litigation about specific
products and will be affected by the devices for aggregating these
populations of related cases.
The products liability category is often visualized as one that
encompasses suits, involving "thousands of products," that have
"jeopardized the health of many industries." °80 Its growth then is
76. Jurisdictions with the greatest concentration of asbestos litigation are listed in D.
HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN, P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHAL-
LENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 8 (1985) (hereinafter HENSLER). The 10 federal district
courts on their list-namely, Northern California, Connecticut, Southern Georgia, Mas-
sachusetts, Southern Mississippi, New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Eastern Tennessee,
Eastern Texas, and Eastern Virginia-had 24% of all the "other" products cases in
1975; 23.2% in 1979; 31.6% in 1983; 35.4% in 1985.
77. Id. at 21. This is the number of cases; the number of asbestos claims was much
higher in most jurisdictions. Id. at 24, 26.
78. On the career of asbestos litigation, see P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT:
THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985); HENSLER, supra note 76.
79. In October 1984, A.H. Robins moved to form a class of more than 3,500 pend-
ing cases with punitive damage claims. M. MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED,
WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD 240 (1985). According to the Legal Times, Apr. 7,
1986, at 11, col. 2, the total number of Dalkon Shield suits by early 1985 was over 8,700.
It is not known how many were in federal courts.
80. Pear, Draft Bill Is Set on Liability Suits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1986, at 14, col. 4
(nat'l ed.). This theory of general and dispersed incidence of products cases is found in
the 1976 to 1978 Annual Reports of the federal courts. See supra note 74. But since the
forms from which the data on products cases were compiled did not generate any infor-
mation about the make-up of the "other" category, this may have been just a plausible
supposition.
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presented as an index and portent of the general growth of litiga-
tion. But if it is a container populated largely by several epidemics
of suits about specific products, it may have less generalizability.
The available data do not tell us whether the products liability cate-
gory contains cases that are widely dispersed across the whole range
of manufactured products, or whether it contains large clusters of
suits involving a relatively small set of products.
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF TERMINATIONS, TIME To DISPOSITION, PERSONNEL
FEDERAL COURTS, 1975 AND 1984
A. Civil Terminations by Stage, District Courts
1975 and 198481
TERMINATED 1975 1984 % INCREASE '75-'84
During/After Trial 8,722 (8.4%) 12,080 (5.0%) + 38.5%
During/After Pre-Trial 15,575 (15.0%) 29,638 (12.3%) + 90.3%
Before Pre-Trial 40,271 (38.8%) 86,135 (35.6%) +113.9%
Subtotal - Above 64,568 (62.2%) 127,853 (52.9%) + 98.0%
No Court Action 39,219 (37.8%) 113,900 (47.1%) + 190.4%
Total 103,787 (100%) 241,753 (100%) +132.9%
B. Median Time to Disposition, District Courts
1975 and 198482
Cases that Terminated 16 months 19 months + 18.7%
During/After Trial
All Cases 9 months 7 months - 22.2%
C. Personnel, Federal Courts
1975 and 198483
Authorized District Judges 383 495 + 29.2%
Total Personnel Federal 10,082 16,667 + 65.3%
judiciary
As above excluding 9,076 13,678 + 50.7%
Bankruptcy
81. Source of data: 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 152.
82. Source of data: 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 153; 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 375.
83. Source of data: 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 111; 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 45.
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Does the course of these cases once they get to court suggest an
increase in the appetite for litigious combat? In federal, as in state
courts, most cases settle. Table 4A summarizes data on termina-
tions from the federal courts in 1975 and 1984. We can see that
there has been no decline in the portion of cases that settles. In-
deed, a declining percentage of cases proceed to trial--or even sur-
vive until the holding of a pre-trial conference. There has been a
great increase in the portion of cases that terminate early in the pro-
cess, 84 paralleling the long-term decline of the portion fully adjudi-
cated in the state courts. 85
Federal courts have become more amply staffed (see Table 4C)
and better managed. As Table 4B shows, the median time from fil-
ing to disposition of cases terminated in 1984 was seven months for
all cases and nineteen months for those that reached trial. 86 (If the
numerous recovery cases are excluded, the median time to disposi-
tion for all cases would go up to nine months.87 ) The median for all
cases in 1975 was nine months,88 but then the median for cases
reaching trial was only sixteen months. 89 Back in 1960, median time
from filing to disposition was almost twice as long as in 1984-17.8
months .90
What do these patterns tell us? More disputes arrive at court by
filing; a decreasing portion of these-though absolutely more--pro-
ceed to later stages of the judicial process. The vast majority are
resolved without full-blown adjudication. Courts are arenas in
which most cases are resolved by negotiation.9
The population of cases is made up of sub-populations with
84. The trend toward termination earlier in the process continued in 1985: cases
reaching trial fell to 5.0% and those reaching pretrial to 11.6%. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 21, at 178.
85. See supra note 22.
86. These remained unchanged in 1985. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at
313.
87. 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 346; 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21,
at 148.
88. 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 211.
89. Id. at 375.
90. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 94. On this secular reduction of delay in
federal courts, see Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal Dis-
trict Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981).
91. Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, and Justice in Many Rooms, supra note 35. In-
deed, some critics contend that while well supplied with lawsuits, we have a shortage of
opportunities for full adjudication to vindicate claims and elucidate principles. See, e.g.,
Alshuler, Mediation with a Mugger. The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-
Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1983).
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their own distinctive traits that reflect such specific factors as the
number, concentration, or diffusion of the injuries or troubles in
question; the presence (or withdrawal) of other ways of dealing with
these troubles; the availability of information about legal remedies;
the development of lawyer expertise; and so forth.9 2 Such a popula-
tion of cases is not just a statistical collection of discrete cases in
which each is measured against a fixed (or slowly changing) frame-
work of law. It has a career. It is a changing stream whose course
shifts and turns as lawyers gain expertise, specialization develops,
new knowledge is generated, information is disseminated, parties
change their expectations, the underlying behavior undergoes
changes, as do insurance practices, record-keeping, and so forth.
New types of cases come onto the scene; some expand into sizable
populations; some stabilize and remain relatively constant for long
periods (such as automobile injury cases and divorces); and others
fade away (for example, black lung and truth-in-lending cases). 93
These changes reflect and reinforce changes in public beliefs
and expectations about the legal system. Thus, the shifting patterns
of filings we observe are compatible with the notion of a general but
uneven spread of higher expectations ofjustice and the growth of a
sense of entitlement to recompense for many kinds of injury. 94 But
this sense is not self-activating and its presence does not sufficiently
account for the patterns of court use. Its translation into claims de-
pends on various contextual factors.
III. THE BENEFITS OF LITIGATION
What difference does it make? Why should we be concerned
about the ebb and flow of different currents of litigation? We hear
much of bizarre claims, immense jury verdicts, undeserved wind-
falls, the engorgement of contingency fee lawyers, financially devas-
tated defendants, and other things that befall the specific
92. This comports with findings in both the United States and Australia that the sub-
ject matter of the claim predicted more about its prospective course than any other fac-
tor. What happens depends on institutionalized ways of handling different kinds of
disputes. Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 28, 39. Cf. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation:
Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 401 (1975) (the cases that come to the
attention of the legal profession constitute a small portion of the problems and conceiv-
able claims that might merit legal advice and protection; the particular distribution of
cases coming to the legal profession reflects the institutional organization of the legal
system, not merely the inability to pay of those who think they want lawyers).
93. The careers of these changing populations in turn cumulate into major changes
in the makeup of court caseloads. See Reading the Landscape, supra note 10, at 42.
94. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY XV-XVi (1980).
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participants in specific cases. Beyond this, we hear much about the
deleterious effects of litigation in the large-that it dampens enter-
prise, distracts managers, makes doctors practice defensive
medicine, increases the cost of products, keeps useful products off
the market, etc. All of these attribute to litigation a powerful effect
not only on the behavior of the immediate parties but on other ac-
tors who respond to the signals that courts broadcast by doing and
avoiding and spending what they would otherwise not have done or
avoided or spent. Are all of these ramifying effects on conduct un-
desirable, so that we should account them as costs? Or should some
of them be accounted as benefits?
Current discussion of the litigation system displays sensitivity to
the various kinds of costs, direct and indirect, that attend the sys-
tem. But in considering benefits there is a tendency to focus only on
the immediate distributive consequences for the parties. Thus, an
insurance executive measures the efficiency of the tort system only
in terms of compensation of claimants' economic losses, with no in-
dication that this transfer might have any other effect.95 The same
blindness to general and public effects is evident in a Wall Street Jour-
nal editorial questioning the need for public courts:
If civil disputes can be satisfactorily resolved by arbitrators,
why is there ever any need to settle them at public ex-
pense? Why should the taxpayers have to support a civil
court system? More to the point, why should jurors have to
pay in time and lost wages to enable a condo developer to
extract a cash settlement from a builder? Private disputes,
unlike criminal proceedings, often have no social conse-
quences. The full costs should fall on the litigants
themselves .96
To balance the anecdotal stock, let me present a few recent
items that caught my attention. I make no claim that they are repre-
sentative of anything. But they do provide vivid illustrations of
some of the beneficial effects of litigation. As an aid to memory, I
give each of them a label:
1. Cape Cod-Consider the Cape Cod restaurant owner who
"has begun giving classes to his employees to help them recognize
intoxicated customers who might later decide to sue him if their in-
toxication should lead to an automobile wreck. 'We've become our
95. See, e.g., R. Sturgis, The Cost of the U.S. Tort System: An Address to the Ameri-
can Insurance Association 16-18 (Nov. 14, 1985) (available from Tillinghast, Nelson &
Warren, Inc.).
96. Settling Out of Court, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
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brother's keeper,' he says." 97
2. Madison Parks-Or consider the changes in park design con-
templated in Madison:
The Madison Parks Commission, acting on advice
from the city attorney, has asked the City Council to re-
move asphalt under playground equipment in city parks.
The asphalt, which was originally installed to eliminate
mud and cut park mowing costs, would be replaced by
softer materials, such as wood chips or pea gravel.
"We want to put in something with a little give to it,"
said Mark Peterson, parks operations analyst. "It's a good
idea, since (liability lawsuit) settlements are going through
the roof."98
3. Princeton Club-Or consider the change in policy of a
Princeton eating club:
One of the three all-male eating clubs at Princeton
University, the University Cottage Club, has voted to admit
women.
The decision, Wednesday night, by the 100-year-old
club's graduate board for governors was made in the midst
of a sex-discrimination suit filed against the clubs and
university.
"The suit encouraged us to look at the issue a lot more
closely than we had in the past," the chairman of the board,
James L. Crawford, said. "We feel it is the right decision
for the long-term benefit of the club. Rather than being
forced to admit women, it made sense."
Mr. Crawford said that the Cottage Club, a stately
Georgian mansion where F. Scott Fitzgerald was a member,
wanted to admit women voluntarily to avoid a possible
court-imposed admissions process.
Mr. Crawford conceded high legal fees influenced the
97. Lindsey, Businesses Change Ways in Fear of Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1985, at 1,
col. 3 (nat'l ed.). Consider also a report from Madison that "More and more people are
being refused another drink or having their car keys taken away by bartenders wary of
being found responsible for the damage drunkards do when they hit the outside world."
Stamler, Bartenders Trade 'Set 'era up Again' Image for None for the Road, [Madison] Capital
Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
98. Waller, Liability Fear Spurs Park Safety Steps, Wis. State J., Aug. 28, 1985, at 4, col.
2. A year later, removal of the hard surfaces was completed and the process of replace-
ment with wood chips was underway. Telephone interview with Dan Stapay, Super-
intendant of Parks, City of Madison (Aug. 11, 1986).
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club's decision to admit women. He said the decision,
which was not unanimous, reflected the results of a poll of
club alumni. "The undergraduates would prefer to have
kept it as it was." 99
According to the New York Times, the Cottage Club admitted its first
women members in February, 1986.100
4. Georgia-Or consider the impact of a recent wrongful dis-
charge case at the University of Georgia:
The Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia today [April 3, 1986] released a special audit re-
port that showed a pattern of academic abuse in the admis-
sion and advancement of student-athletes at the University
of Georgia for the last four years.
The report concluded that the preferential academic
treatment was given because of pressure from the athletic
department .... The report also stated that the university
officers who had admitted authorizing the academic excep-
tions said they acted with the knowledge of the university's
president ....
... Although such treatment for athletes has been ru-
mored at many schools, many times, this is the first time it
has been documented through an official investigation.
The investigation was ordered in the wake of a jury
award of $2.57 million to Dr. Jan Kemp, a former English
instructor in the Developmental Studies Program, who had
sued the university, charging that she had been dismissed
in 1983 for protesting favorable treatment given to stu-
dent-athietes .... The jury verdict stunned the university,
the state government and legions of loyal followers of the
athletic teams, and the affair has continued to unravel in
ways harmful to the university's reputation. The state has
appealed the case.101
Each of these accounts reports changes as a result of litigation.
In each case, the changes strike me as including at least some bene-
fits. The flow of beneficial effects may be related to the litigation in
different ways. In Georgia, the parties were still embroiled in oner-
ous and expensive litigation when the above account was written,
99. A Princeton Club to Admit Women, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1986, at 13, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
100. Princeton Settles Suit for Bias, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1986, at 12, col. 4 (nat'il ed.).
101. Clendinen, Investigation of Georgia U. Cites Preferential Grading for Athletes, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1, 45, cols. 1-2 (nat'! ed.).
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but they subsequently settled.'0 2 In'Pinceton Club, the litigation ter-
minated early for the club that adjusted its behavior, but proceeded
for the other defendants."' 3 In Cape Cod and Madison Parks, behavior
was adjusted with an eye to preventing harm and avoiding future
litigation. This is the "[s]hadow of the [1]aw,"' 4 and it may be a
benign shadow.
To analyze this shadow, it is useful to distinguish between "spe-
cial effects" and "general effects." Special effects are the effects
produced by the impact of litigation (full-blown, attenuated, or
threatened) on the parties immediately involved. General effects
are (a) effects of the communication to others of information about
litigation, including (b) effects of the response to that
information.' 0 5
Special effects are changes in the behavior of the specific actors
102. In post-trial proceedings, the jury award was reduced to $679,682.65 plus inter-
est, costs, and attorney's fees by the trial judge. Kemp v. Ervin, Civil Action No. C83-
330A, (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 1986) (order reducing jury award). A final settlement of
$1,080,000 was reached in early May, 1986. Telephone interview with Joseph C. Nel-
son, III, Esq., Athens, Ga. (Aug. 8, 1986).
103. In June 1986, an administrative law judge found that the other two clubs had
violated New Jersey's anti-discrimination law. Judge Finds 2 Clubs At Princeton Guilty in Sex-
Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,Jun. 22, 1986, at 17, col. 5 (nat'l ed.). A month later, Princeton
University, accused of "aiding and abetting" the clubs' discriminatory practices, settled
with the complainant, paying $27,500 for her legal and other expenses. Princeton Settles
Suit on Bias, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1986, at 12, col. 4 (nat'l ed.).
104. Since only a small fraction of behavior is regulated by full-blown adjudication,
the influence of courts and rules on most behavior and on the resolution of most dis-
putes is not direct, but through the anticipation of what courts might do. Cf. Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 34;Justice in Many Rooms, supra note 35.
105. This notion of "general effects" takes off from the very helpful discussion of
general preventive effects of punishment by J. GIBBS, CRIME,PUNISHMENT AND DETER-
RENCE (1975), as usefully elaborated by Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A
Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 497, 517-21 (1976). It is
simply a generalization from the illuminating and now familiar (if not entirely service-
able, as Gibbs points out) distinction between special deterrence and general deterrence
introduced by Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
949 (1966). Theory about these general effects is still inchoate. In a review of the now
sizable literature on deterrence, Gibbs observes that since deterrence research has pro-
ceeded without controls for other general effects, "all previous purported tests of the
deterrence doctrine.., are tests of an implicit theory of general preventive effects; and
such will remain the case as long as nondeterrent mechanisms are left uncontrolled."
Gibbs, The Deterrence Doctrine: Theory, Research and Penal Policy, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986). The literature on the effects of tort law
displays the same conflation of deterrence with other preventive effects that Gibbs finds
in the criminal law literature. Some of the labels used here for the various effects are
inspired by (but disloyal to) those carefully discussed by Gibbs in The Deterrence Doctrine,
supra. A fuller taxonomy of the effects of litigation can be found in Galanter, The Radiat-
ing Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 124-42 (K. Boyum & L.
Mather eds. 1983).
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involved in a particular lawsuit-like the Princeton Club or the Uni-
versity of Georgia or the plaintiffs who sued them. We can, in the-
ory at least, isolate various kinds of effects on the subsequent
activity of such actors. An actor may be deprived of resources for
future violations. This is incapacitation. Or the result of litigation
may be increased surveillance which renders future offending behav-
ior less likely. The Georgia case dramatically illustrates this surveil-
lance effect. Or the offending actor may be deterred by fear of
being caught again. This is special deterrence. Or the experience of
being exposed to the law may change the actor's view that it is right
to exclude women or pass failing athletes or whatever. This is
reformation.
In addition to these special effects on the parties before the
court, there may be effects on wider audiences that we may call gen-
eral effects. Litigation against one actor may lead others to reassess
the risks and advantages of similar activity. We see this displayed in
our Cape Cod and Madison Parks examples. This is general deterrence. It
neither presumes nor requires any change in the moral evaluation of
the acts in question, nor does it involve any change in opportunities
to commit them. It stipulates that behavior will be affected by the
acquisition of more information about the costs and benefits that
are likely to attach to the act-information about the certainty, ce-
lerity, and severity of "punishment," for example. Thus, the actors
can hold to what Hart called the "external point of view,"' 10 6 treat-
ing law as a fact to be taken into account rather than a normative
framework that they are committed to uphold or be guided by. The
information that induces the changed estimate of costs and benefits
need not be accurate. What a court has done may be inaccurately
perceived; indeed, the court may have inaccurately depicted what it
has done.
On the other hand, communication of the existence of a law or
its application by a court may change the moral evaluation by others
of a specific item of conduct. To the extent that this involves not the
calculation or the probability of being visited by certain costs and
benefits, but a change in moral estimation, we may call this general
effect enculturation. There is suggestive evidence to indicate that at
least some segments of the population are subject to such effects.1 0 7
106. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-87 (1961).
107. See Berkowitz & Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30 SOCIOMETRY 410 (1967);
Colombatos, Physicians and Medicare: A Before-After Study of the Effects of Legislation on Atti-
tudes, 34 AM. Soc. REV. 318 (1969). Other studies provide suggestive but contrasting
hypotheses about the conditions under which such enculturation takes place and its rela-
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Less dramatically, perceiving the application of law may maintain or
intensify existing evaluations of conduct, an effect that Gibbs' 8 calls
normative validation.
In addition to these effects on the underlying behavior, litiga-
tion may produce effects on the level of disputing behavior. It may
encourage or discourage the parties to a case from making (or re-
sisting) other claims. And generally it may encourage claimants and
lawyers to pursue claims of a given type. It may provide symbols for
rallying a group, broadcasting awareness of grievances, and drama-
tizing challenges to the status quo. On the other hand, grievances
may lose legitimacy, claims may be discouraged, and organizational
capacity dissipated. These effects may be labeled mobilization and
demobilization. 'o
While supposition about the effects of litigation is abundant, se-
rious studies of these effects are relatively rare. During the 1960s,
political scientists (chiefly) accumulated a body of findings on the
impact of decisions of the United States Supreme Court (mostly)
and other appellate courts, exploring the extent to which these deci-
sions elicited compliance from the lower courts, school boards, po-
lice and other agencies they were designed to regulate.1 ' 0 A critical
survey of this literature concluded that:
[T]he decisions of the Court, far from producing uniform
impact or automatic compliance, have varying effects-
from instances in which no action follows upon them to
wide degrees of compliance (usually underreported),
resistance, and evasion. These varying effects include in-
creases in the level of political activity and activity within
the judicial system itself and changes in governmental
tion to the coercive aspects of law. The reaction of local school boards to decisions of
the United States Supreme Court banning officially sponsored prayer in classrooms was
examined in W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATITUDE CHANGE
(1967), and K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT
POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE (1971). Muir finds substantial compliance and substantial
enculturation associated with low perceived coerciveness of the legal setting; Dolbeare
and Hammond, finding little compliance, attribute the dissociation of practice from legal
doctrine to the absence of coercive pressure.
108. See supra note 105.
109. Indeed, one of the most evident effects of recent litigation has been its profound
mobilizational effect on various groups like doctors and insurers who are involved in
political initiatives to change it.
110. This literature is usefully surveyed in S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970); a convenient sampling of the liter-
ature may be found in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker & M. Fee-
ley 2d. ed. 1973). The limitations of this genre are critically examined in Feeley, supra
note 105.
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structure . . . . Important social interests, both economic
and noneconomic, may be dislocated or legitimated, and
the Court's decisions also often perform an agenda-setting
function for other political actors."'
A new generation of "impact" research has widened its con-
cerns from the United States Supreme Court to other courts, from
public to private law, and from a focus on compliance with doctrinal
pronouncements to ascertainment of a wider range of effects. Re-
cent work includes studies tracing out the effects of specific tort
cases. Thus, Wiley found that a decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington" t2 holding liable an ophthalmologist for failing to test a
young patient for glaucoma did bring about an increase in the
amount of testing for glaucoma in young patients. 1 3 And Givelber,
Bowers and Blitch found that a California decision,'"' holding that
therapists had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect third
parties from violence by their patients, had important effects nation-
wide.' Eighteen months after its highly publicized original ruling
that a therapist has a duty to warn the potential victim, the court,
upon reconsideration, nullified its earlier opinion and modified the
duty to one of exercising reasonable care to protect potential vic-
tims. The researchers found that the case was widely known by
therapists throughout the nation, that observance of its ruling was
felt to be obligatory by most even though technically the ruling
bound only those in California," 6 that "by and large the case ap-
pears to be misunderstood as involving and requiring the warning
of potential victims"" 7 [i.e., in accordance with the withdrawn origi-
nal opinion]-and that the case influenced therapists' responses to
threatening behavior toward giving warnings, initiating involuntary
hospitalizations, and taking notes. 1 8 The story is wonderfully com-
plex. What happens is remote from a calculated intervention by the
111. S. WASBY, supra note 110, at 243.
112. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
113. Wiley, The Impact ofJudicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 373-74 (1981). However, the admixture of other influences pro-
moting more testing leads the author to conclude that "the actual impact of Helling...
seems to have been quite minor." Id. at 385.
114. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553,
118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), withdrawn and replaced by 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
115. Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private
Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443.
116. Id. at 474.
117. Id. at 466.
118. Id. at 481-82.
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court designed to bring about these effects;" 9 and the therapists'
response is more than a calculating re-estimation of costs and
benefits. 
2 1
In contrast to these studies focusing on the radiating effects of a
single decision, other researchers have examined the way that an
array of judicial decisions impinges on decisionmaking by private
actors. Thus, a study of large manufacturers found that:
[E]xcept for firms subject to the maximally intrusive regu-
lation of such agencies as the Food and Drug and the Fed-
eral Aviation administrations, product liability is the most
significant influence on product safety efforts. Product lia-
bility, however, conveys an indistinct signal. The long lags
between the design decision and the final judgment on
product liability claims (frequently five or more years), the
inconsistent behavior of juries, and the rapid change in ju-
dicial doctrine in the area, all tended to muffle the signal.
Of all the various external social pressures, product li-
ability has the greatest influence on product design deci-
sions. The other influences largely work through the
product liability mechanism.' 21
A study of small manufacturers of agricultural implements in Cali-
fornia found that 22% had dropped product lines out of fear of
products liability suits. 122
I am not claiming that these effects are optimal or that the ben-
efits they produce outweigh all the costs or that existing litigation
patterns represent the best way to achieve these benefits. But we
should recognize that benefits are present and that any assessment
of the social value of litigation must take account of them and must
involve an attempt to estimate the net effects of present litigation
patterns and the proposed or likely alternatives. These examples
119. The authors remind us that this is an instance in which "a court announced a rule
designed to change private behavior without reliable data regarding the practices it was
intending to change, the extent of the problem it was trying to remedy, or the costs
which the proposed cure would impose." Id. at 444. The court had "no mechanism for
monitoring the impact of its decision." Id. at 445.
120. Indeed a majority of respondents had translated the obligation to threatened
third parties into a requirement of professional ethics. Id. at 475.
121. G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii-viii (1983).
122. Comment, Products Liability: The Impact on California Manufacturers, 19 AM. Bus. L.J.
343, 357 (1981). The survey included large manufacturers, but their response rate was
so low that I am reporting only the author's results for the smaller manufacturers.
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should also remind us that these effects are not ascertainable by sup-
position or by deduction.
The studies mentioned above are revealing, but they are only
the beginning of what we need to form a realistic picture of the way
that legal doctrine and institutions affect conduct. Although reliable
knowledge about litigation and its effects is thin and spotty, there is
a flourishing folk sociology about the causes, dimensions, and con-
sequences of the present "crises." Space permits only a few exam-
ples. One is the notion that there has been a runaway growth of tort
litigation and an unparalleled enlargement of the tort system en-
couraged by the progressive loosening of liability standards. But as
we have seen, tort filings have increased only modestly.' 23 While
expenditures for the tort system have grown more rapidly than gov-
ernment as a whole or the Gross National Product, they have lagged
behind other entitlement systems, such as public aid, government
health care, and social insurance. Nor have tort costs outpaced
those of Workers' Compensation. 24
Similarly, there are grounds for skepticism of the confident as-
sertion that recent dramatic cost increases and restrictions on insur-
ance coverage are closely linked to specified features of American
tort litigation. A similar crisis in the mid 197 0s proved short-lived
and passed without any important changes in the tort system. 125
Similar contractions of insurance availability seem to occur indepen-
dently of the presence of these features. Ontario, which enjoys free-
dom from virtually all of the objectionable features of the United
States tort system-jury trial, punitive damages, contingent fees,
open-ended awards for noneconomic damages-is experiencing a
very similar insurance crisis. 126
IV. SURVIVING THE LITIGATION PANIC
I hope I have persuaded you that respect for the available evi-
dence suggests a more benign reading of our current situation than
is found in the discourse that depicts us in a lawsuit crisis, litigation
explosion, etc.:
123. See supra p. 7 , Table 1.
124. "Tort costs per capita in 1984 were $281, as compared to $287 per worker for
Workers' Compensation." R. Sturgis, supra note 95, at 10, 18.
125. See Page & Stephens, The Products Liability Insurance Crisis: Causes, Nostrums and
Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 387 (1984).
126. Berkowitz, In Canada, Different Legal and Popular Views Prevail, Wall St. J., Apr. 4,
1986, at 23, col. 4; Harrington, "Crisis" Team to Investigate Soaring Price of Insurance, To-
ronto Star, Jan. 10, 1986 at A1, col. 1.
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- Higher caseloads do not reflect a heightened appetite
for adversarial combat; they represent people trying to
cope with problems in a given array of remedial
alternatives.
- We are not faced with an inexorable exponential ex-
plosion of cases, but rather with a series of local changes,
some sudden but most incremental, as particular kinds of
disputes move in and out of the ambit of the courts.
- The effects of litigation include an admixture of bene-
fits as well as costs-as do the alternative ways of handling
such troubles; the net effects of each type cannot be ascer-
tained by deduction or supposition.
Why the consternation about litigation? Why is the bad face of
law so evident and its good face hidden to so many? The answer is
surely complex, but let me just mention a couple of things. First,
litigation implies accountability to public standards. The heighten-
ing of public accountability is in many quarters an unwelcome
counter to deregulation or self-regulation. The sense of being held
to account has multiplied far more than cases or trials, for it de-
pends, as we have seen, not on the direct imposition of court orders,
but on the communication of messages about what courts might do.
Law as a system of symbols has expanded; information about law
and its workings is more widely and vividly circulated to more edu-
cated and receptive audiences. 127 As a source of symbols and bar-
gaining counters, litigation patterns have changed too. The
predominance of cases enforcing market relations has given way to
tort, civil rights, and public law cases "correcting" the market. 128 It
is such litigation "up"-by outsiders and clients and dependents
against authorities and managers of established institutions-that
excites most of the reproach of our litigious society.1 29
The sense that America is uniquely cursed by rampant commu-
nity-destroying legalism, unravelling the fabric of trust, distorting
markets, and confounding authority, strikes me as yet another rein-
carnation of the worn clich6 of America as a land of alienation and
oppression. The American reality, in all of its puzzling complexity,
is found wanting in comparison to an imagined harmonious and or-
127. On the "explosion" of information about law, see Legal Malaise, supra note 10.
128. On the changing composition of court caseloads, see Reading the Landscape, supra
note 10, at 41-43.
129. See Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Injuries in an American
Community, 18 LAw & Soc'y REV. 551 (1984).
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ganic society. Instead of yielding to this cliche, we should take
America's variform and changing patterns of litigation as a chal-
lenge to explore the central and distinctive features of this society.
